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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 11, 2015 Jessica Starr was convicted at a jury trial for possession of marijuana
and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to the trial, the court had granted defendant's motion
to suppress in-part and denied the motion to suppress in-part. It granted suppression based on an
illegal search of Starr's room, and suppressed everything found during the illegal search.
At trial, the prosecution presented audio from the night of the search, including portions
of Officer Hammer questioning Starr in her room immediately after the illegal search occurred.
Starr objected to these portions of the audio because it was intertwined with the illegal search of
her room. The magistrate court ultimately allowed the admissions into evidence.
Because of the court's ruling on the admissions, the defendant sought to introduce the
entirety of the audio recording to give the jury a full understanding of the context of Starr's
admissions. Although the court acknowledged that the audio might show the admissions were
not reliable because of the pressure on Starr, the court felt that it would be unfair to the state to
allow the entire audio into evidence. Instead, the court allowed the officer to be recalled and
questioned about that night.
Starr timely appealed asserting that(!) the magistrate court erred by allow Starr's
confession into evidence without addressing whether the taint of the illegal search had been
attenuated, and (2) the magistrate court erred in prohibiting Starr from introducing the entire
audio into evidence to show the circumstances of her admissions.
The district court found that the statements were made in close proximity to the search,
but affirmed the magistrate regarding the admissions after a partial consideration of the relevant
legal factors. The district court also affirmed the magistrate in preventing the defendant from
introducing the remaining portions of the audio.

ISSUES
3. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate, when the magistrate did
not perform the required analysis of attenuation before admitting statements
made by Starr as she sat on her bed during an unconstitutional search of her
room?
4. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate, when the magistrate
deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the jury the unplayed portions
of Hammer's audio?
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ARGUMENT
1. The district court erred in affinning the magistrate, because the magistrate did not
perform the required analysis of attenuation before admitting statements made by
Starr during the unconstitutional search.
The foundation law on suppression issues is largely uncontested in this case. For
example, the exclusionary rule deters law enforcement officials by disallowing the use of

evidence gained through the unconstitutional conduct. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
805 (1984). "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The
exclusionary rule plainly applies to evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional
search or seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963). However, exclusion
does not stop with the direct fruit, it "extends as well to the indirect as the direct products" of the
unconstitutional conduct. Id.
The question is whether "the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint." Wong Sun at 488.
To start the process, a defendant need only put forward a factual nexus sufficient to show
that the "challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity."

Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 4 71 (1980)). 1 Once a
factual nexus is alleged, the state bears the burden of establishing that the taint has attenuated, or

1 lt should be noted that the "but for" analysis was put forward in a five/four decision, which ultimately was decided
on the narrower grounds of independent source, and the purported test-which has been reiterated again and again
by Idaho courts-was only dicta expressing the majorities opinion of analysis in Crews, which can also be
characterized as an independent source case.
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that there is an independent source of the evidence----other than exploitation of the alleged tainted
evidence. State v. Kape/le, 158 ldaho 121 (Ct.App. 2014).
As the Supreme Court in Crews notes the typical case starts with the premise that the
challenged evidence is tainted.
In the typical "fruit of the poisonous tree" case, however, the challenged
evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment
violation, and the question before the court is whether the chain of causation
proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been
interrupted by some intervening circumstances so as to remove the "taint"
imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality. Thus, most cases begin with
the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal
governmental activity.
Crews, 445 U.S. at 471.

The Idaho Court of Appeals has affirmed this position and clarified prior Idaho case law:
"By expressing the query as a "but for" test, we do not imply that a defendant bears the burden to
prove the negative----that the state would not or could not have discovered the evidence on any
set of hypothetical circumstances that could have arisen absent the illegal search." State v.

Kape/le, 158 Idaho 121 (Ct.App. 2014). Instead, a defendant need only establish the factual
nexus between the illegal act and the objected to evidence. Id.
In this case, the state conceded that some of the evidence was properly suppressed. Trial
Tr. p. 3411. 9-11. The state did not argue any of the factors of attenuation: (I) The temporal
proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) whether there are intervening
circumstances between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; and (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct. As such, the magistrate did not consider the three factors,
nor did it rule based on those factors.
On appeal, the district court chose not to address all the factors either. The district court
found that although the magistrate did not conduct a full attenuation analysis, the magistrate was

4

not required to do so because the magistrate "properly concluded that the temporal proximity test
was not satisfied." R. pp. 200-01. Rather, than remand for consideration of the proper legal
standard, and fact finding, the district court chose to attempt to remedy the flaw itself. In so
doing the district court abused its discretion.
First the district court considered only a single factor of the attenuation analysis as a
"test", without considering the other two. R. at 201. This approach is flawed because the district
court is considering only part of an analysis without considering other factors-i.e. it replaces a
totality approach with an analysis that places certain factors as a gateway to other factors.
Additionally, the finding made by the district court that the statements were not temporally
proximate to the illegal search is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and are
internally incoherent with a finding that it was proximate.
The state's audio, which was played at the suppression hearing and which the parties
were discussing at trial, firmly refutes any position that the statements were not temporally
proximate to the illegal search. The district court "agree[d] that the statements were made in
close proximity to the illegal search." R. at 200-0 I. But the court found that the "temporal
proximity test was not satisfied. Therefore, there was no need to address the remaining factors."
R. at 201. The internal incoherence of this rational makes the district court's holding
unsustainable for an abuse of discretion, because it lacks reason.
The admission should not have been admitted into evidence without some showing or
argument about how the taint of the unconstitutional conduct had been dispelled. Miranda
warnings alone are not sufficient. It was inappropriate for the appellate court to attempt an after
the fact legal analysis and findings of fact, when such a burden is squarely on the trial court's
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shoulders and the district court indicated that the trial court did not perform such analysis or fact
finding. As such, the district court erred.
2. The district court erred in affirming the magistrate because the magistrate
deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the jury the unplayed portions of
the officer's audio.

The Idaho Rules of Evidence establish the general rule that: "All relevant evidence is
admissible." I.R.E. 402. In the present case, magistrate failed to establish a basis for varying
from this general rule. The state has reframed the issue on appeal as whether the defendant has
failed to establish abuse of discretion for the evidentiary ruling. However, the magistrate did not
perform a legal analysis for admission of evidence that fits within the contours of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence. The magistrate based its rulings on a desire to be fair to both sides, rather
than on the express language of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Failure to act within the specified
guidelines amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Although the state attempted to save the ruling by arguing that it was based on Rule 403,
the trial court made no finding that the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative
value-which would be required for an exercise of Rule 403.
The magistrate had already found that the officer had to "wheedle" Starr to get into her
room. Motion to Suppress Tr. p. 62 I. 11. The defendant sought to undermining the credibility of
the admission by making the jury aware that the of the "wheedling" that the magistrate found at
the motion to suppress. Motion to Suppress Tr. p. 63 I. 4.
The admissibility of these statements is illustrated in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986). In Crane the Kentucky court erred by having the jury address the voluntariness of
confessions, however, it is the case's discussion regarding evidence of the circumstances ofa
confession that are helpful in deciding the issue at hand.
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The United States Supreme Court noted in Crane v. Kentucky, "In laying down these
rules the Court has never questioned that evidence surrounding the making of a confession bears
on its credibility as well as its voluntariness." 476 U.S. 683,688 (1986) (citation omitted).
[T]he physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can
also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary,
are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor's case, a
confession may be shown to be 'insufficiently corroborated or
otherwise ... unworthy of belief.'
Id at 689 (citation omitted). Ultimately, it is the jury that is "at liberty to disregard confessions

that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of belief." Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. at 486. This is true even if the court has deemed the statement voluntary, or if the
defendant has chosen not to seek suppression, but to argue credibility to the jury. Ultimately, the
Kentucky erred in giving the jury the opportunity to determine whether the statement was
voluntary, not by allowing the jury to determine the credibility of the admissions.
Although the state posits that "nothing in the law prevents" the state from objecting to
the use of suppressed evidence, there has been no authority for the objection cited. Indeed, unless
a basis for such an objection, the general rule that evidence is admissible should have governed
the trial court's ruling. The trial court failed to allow the admission of evidence without giving a
cogent legal basis for the exclusion of the evidence, as such it failed to act within the outer
bounds of its discretion. Thus, the district court erred in upholding the ruling on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The magistrate court erred by allowing audio of Starr's admission, over objection, and

without addressing whether the taint from the illegal search extended to those statements.
Additionally, the magistrate court erred by failing to establish a basis for keeping out the

remaining portions of audio, which Starr sought to admit-inter alia-to undermine Starr's
admissions.

For the forgoing reasons, Jessica Starr respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court's ruling upholding the magistrate, and grant a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 2016.

/
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~------~c. Ira Dillman
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